A Theory of Wages and Labor Demand with Intra-Firm Bargaining and Matching Frictions

30 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2008

See all articles by Pierre Cahuc

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Francois Marque

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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Abstract

This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic bargaining. We yield explicit closed form solutions with heterogeneous labor inputs and capital. The solution exhibits overemployment. We show that higher relative bargaining power for some groups of workers may lead to overemployment relative to other groups, with such other groups being underemployed instead if they have a lower relative bargaining power. Similarly, the hold-up problem between capitalists and employees does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in physical capital.

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Marque, Francois, A Theory of Wages and Labor Demand with Intra-Firm Bargaining and Matching Frictions. International Economic Review, Vol. 49, Issue 3, pp. 943-972, August 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1175381 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00502.x

Pierre Cahuc (Contact Author)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Francois Marque

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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