Static Stability in Games

42 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2008

See all articles by Igal Milchtaich

Igal Milchtaich

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 25, 2008

Abstract

Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior. Examples of static notions of stability include evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS), both of which are meaningful or justifiable only for particular classes of games, namely, symmetric multilinear games or symmetric games with a unidimensional strategy space, respectively. This paper presents a general notion of local static stability, of which the above two are essentially special cases. It is applicable to virtually all n-person strategic games, both symmetric and asymmetric, with non-discrete strategy spaces.

Keywords: Stability of equilibrium, static stability

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Milchtaich, Igal, Static Stability in Games (July 25, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1176648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1176648

Igal Milchtaich (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

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