Posted: 24 Aug 1998
We report the results of an experiment designed to examine investment project selection under promotion incentives, modeled as tournament contracts. For a given expected return, the owner prefers investments with lower systematic risk. Therefore, to the extent managers select investments other than those yielding the highest risk-adjusted rates of return, they diverge from what the owner desires. In the presence of promotion incentives, we identify a situation in which the maximization of expected compensation by managers is incompatible with their selection of investment projects that maximize the risk-adjusted rate of return. The results indicated that subjects recognize the strategic implications of alternative promotion scenarios and respond to them in an opportunistic fashion.
JEL Classification: J33, G31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Fargher, Neil L. and Rankin, Frederick W. and Sayre, Todd L., The Effects of Promotion Incentives on Delegated Investment Decisions: A Note. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=117859