How Timely are Earnings When Costs are Sticky? Implications for the Link Between Conditional Conservatism and Cost Stickiness

35 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2008

See all articles by Carsten Homburg

Carsten Homburg

University of Cologne

Julia Nasev

Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich

Abstract

We interpret cost stickiness, i.e., the manager's decision to bear the costs of unutilized resources when sales decline, as a risky project and examine its impact on conditional conservatism. We find that cost stickiness increases the asymmetric timeliness of earnings by weakening the timeliness of earnings for good news firms and, at the same time, intensifying the timeliness of earnings for bad news firms. Additionally, the results suggest that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings for cost sticky firms is more strongly driven through accounting factors, as reflected in accruals than through non-accounting factors, as reflected in cash flow. Our results imply that cost stickiness is more costly due to conditional conservatism and that the market separates the efficient from the inefficient cost sticky firms indicating that information asymmetry is low. Future research could test whether conditional conservatism helps mitigating the information asymmetry induced by cost stickiness.

Keywords: Accounting Conservatism, Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Basu (1997), Conditional Conservatism, Cost Stickiness

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M44, M46, D82, G14

Suggested Citation

Homburg, Carsten and Nasev, Julia, How Timely are Earnings When Costs are Sticky? Implications for the Link Between Conditional Conservatism and Cost Stickiness. AAA 2009 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1187082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1187082

Carsten Homburg

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Julia Nasev (Contact Author)

Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

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