Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?

International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC 2008), Innsbruck, Austria, August 19-22 , 2008

8 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2009  

Lian Jian

University of Southern California - Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism

Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason

UC Berkeley; University of Michigan

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods. The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer. We din this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.

Keywords: peer-to-peer, generalized reciprocity, free-riding, p2p, file sharing

Suggested Citation

Jian, Lian and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks? (2008). International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC 2008), Innsbruck, Austria, August 19-22 , 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1199506 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1199506

Lian Jian

University of Southern California - Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism ( email )

3502 Watt Way, Suite 304
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~ljian/

Jeffrey MacKie-Mason (Contact Author)

UC Berkeley ( email )

102 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jeff-mason.com

University of Michigan ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1092
United States

HOME PAGE: http://http:/jeff-mason.com/

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
43