Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination

34 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2008 Last revised: 1 Mar 2009

See all articles by Mathew D. McCubbins

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University (deceased)

Ramamohan Paturi

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Nicholas Weller

University of California, Riverside (UCR)

Date Written: August 4, 2008

Abstract

Networks can affect a group's ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks.

Keywords: networks, coordinatinon, experiments, human behavior

Suggested Citation

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Paturi, Ramamohan and Weller, Nicholas, Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination (August 4, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1201387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1201387

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University (deceased)

Ramamohan Paturi

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0502
United States

Nicholas Weller (Contact Author)

University of California, Riverside (UCR) ( email )

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA CA 92521
United States

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