Apologies and Settlement Levers

43 Pages Posted: 4 Aug 2008 Last revised: 26 Jan 2009

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 4, 2008


This study uses experimental methods to explore the role of apologies in legal settlement negotiation. Specifically, the study examines the influences of apologies on disputants' perceptions, and the effects of apologies on a number of judgments that influence negotiation outcomes -- settlement levers such as reservation prices, aspirations, and judgments of fair settlement amounts. Five-hundred fifty-six participants were asked to take the role of potential plaintiffs, to provide their reactions to an experimental scenario, and to indicate the values they would set for each settlement lever. The nature of the communication with the offender and the description of the evidentiary rule governing the admissibility of the offender's statement were manipulated. The data suggest that apologies can promote settlement by altering the injured parties' perceptions of the situation and the offender so as to make them more amenable to settlement discussions and by altering the values of the injured parties' settlement levers in ways that are likely to increase the chances of settlement. The results suggest further, however, that the nature of the apology itself as well as the factural circumstances surrounding the incident may play important roles in how apologies are understood.

Keywords: apology, settlement, negotiation, decision making

JEL Classification: K13, K41

Suggested Citation

Robbennolt, Jennifer K., Apologies and Settlement Levers (August 4, 2008). Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 3, p. 333, 2006, Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 08-04, U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-037, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1201482 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1201482

Jennifer K. Robbennolt (Contact Author)

University of Illinois College of Law ( email )

504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-333-6623 (Phone)

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