Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Posted: 9 Sep 1998

See all articles by Oliver Hart

Oliver Hart

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

John Moore

University of Edinburgh - Economics; London School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1998

Abstract

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading "incomplete contracting." However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.

JEL Classification: D23

Suggested Citation

Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John Hardman, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts (August 1998). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1846. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=121248

Oliver D. Hart (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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John Hardman Moore

University of Edinburgh - Economics ( email )

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London School of Economics ( email )

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