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Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies

55 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2008 Last revised: 26 Dec 2014

Kimberly D. Krawiec

Duke University School of Law

Date Written: February 13, 2009

Abstract

Central to every legal system is the principle that certain items are off-limits to commercial exchange. In theory, babies are one such sacred object. This supposed ban on baby selling has been lamented by those who view commercial markets as the most efficient means of allocating resources, and defended by those who contend that commercial markets in parental rights commodify human beings, compromise individual dignity, or jeopardize fundamental values. However, the supposed and much-discussed baby selling ban does not, and is not intended to, eliminate commercial transactions in children. Instead, it is an asymmetric legal restriction that limits the ability of baby market suppliers to share in the full profits generated by their reproductive labor, insisting instead that they derive a large portion of their compensation from the utility associated with altruistic donation. Meanwhile, a wide range of baby market intermediaries profit handsomely in the baby market, without similar restrictions on their market activities. Baby selling "bans" thus have more in common with the rent-seeking by powerful marketplace actors seen in other commercial markets than with normative statements about the sanctity of human life. The author concludes with a call for the removal of the last vestiges of the "ban" against baby selling and other laws that diminish the capacity of baby market suppliers to access the marketplace.

Keywords: altruism, intermediation, commodification, baby markets

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation

Krawiec, Kimberly D., Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies (February 13, 2009). Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 65, 2008; UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1212656. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1212656

Kimberly D. Krawiec (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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