Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work

Tilburg University CentER Discussion Paper No. 9856

32 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 1998

See all articles by Gerard J. van den Berg

Gerard J. van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Bas van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Jan C. van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 1998

Abstract

In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporarily benefit reduction can be imposed. This paper investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition from welfare to work using a unique set of rich administrative data on welfare recipients in The Netherlands. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work. We also describe the other determinants of the transition from welfare to work.

JEL Classification: J65, J64, C41

Suggested Citation

van den Berg, Gerard J. and van der Klaauw, Bas and van Ours, Jan C., Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work (May 1998). Tilburg University CentER Discussion Paper No. 9856. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=121269 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.121269

Gerard J. Van den Berg

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6132 (Phone)
+32 20 444 6020 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Bas Van der Klaauw (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6120 (Phone)
+31 20 444 6005 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Jan C. Van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2880 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

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