On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games

Posted: 2 Nov 1998

See all articles by Fioravante Patrone

Fioravante Patrone

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Graziano Pieri

Università degli Studi di Genova

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Anna Torre

University of Pavia

Abstract

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.

There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of "personalized" Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Patrone, Fioravante and Pieri, Graziano and Tijs, Stef H. and Torre, Anna, On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 27, Iss. 2, August 31, 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=121328

Fioravante Patrone (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica ( email )

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy
+39-010-3536835 (Phone)
+39-010-3536752 (Fax)

Graziano Pieri

Università degli Studi di Genova ( email )

Institute of Scientific and Technical Disciplines
I-16146 Genoa
Italy

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Anna Torre

University of Pavia ( email )

Via Strada Nuova, 65
I-27100 Pavia
Italy

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
932
PlumX Metrics