28 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2008
Date Written: August 11, 2008
In Kibera, Nairobi Kenya's largest slum, getting property rights enforced is no simple matter. Structures are owned by one person and rented by another, neither of whom have rights to the land on which the structure stands. Rental contracts are the subject of frequent dispute for residents and government conflict resolution mechanisms are inaccessible. Using structured interviews and working with local community based organizations we were able to identify three different mechanisms for contract enforcement that developed apart from the formal government channel: 1) bureaucratic entrepreneurs willing to act outside of their area of authority; 2) community based organizations; and 3) ethnic gangs. All of these mechanisms assist people in getting their property rights contracts enforced. In this paper we establish a rubric for the assessment of welfare maximization based on extant literature in new institutional economics. We discuss each of these contract enforcement institutions and evaluate them against the rubric. We find that these organically developed solutions to the inaccessibility of government mechanisms for contact enforcement are not obviously superior to the formal institutions.
Keywords: Africa, Kenya, property, law, institutions
JEL Classification: O17, O18, R31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Joireman, Sandra Fullerton and Sweet, Rachel, In Search of Order: Property Rights Enforcement in Kibera Settlement, Kenya (August 11, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1217867 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1217867