Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy

34 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2008 Last revised: 28 Dec 2013

Richard Schmalensee

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 30, 2009

Abstract

Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.

Keywords: antitrust, standards, innovation, patent, industrial organization

JEL Classification: K21, L40, O38

Suggested Citation

Schmalensee, Richard, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy (April 30, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1219784

Richard Schmalensee (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

Room E62-525
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2957 (Phone)
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