Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries

69 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2008 Last revised: 20 Sep 2023

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

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Date Written: January 15, 2010

Abstract

This paper has four goals. The first, and perhaps the most important, is to provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious composition at the sub-national level for a large number of countries. This data set allows us to measure segregation of different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups within the same country. The second goal is to correlate measures of segregation with measures of quality of the polity and policymaking. The third is to construct an instrument that helps to overcome the endogeneity problem that arises both because groups may move within a country in response to policies, and because governments determine the borders of sub-national regions. We find that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries, i.e., those where groups live more spatially separately, have a substantially lower quality of government. In contrast, we find no relationship between religious segregation and the quality of government. Finally, we provide evidence that trust is an important mediating factor between segregation and the quality of government. Generalized trust is lower in more segregated countries.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries (January 15, 2010). American Economic Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1220263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1220263

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

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Paris, 75014 75014
France

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