Designing Cartels Through Censorship

6 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2008 Last revised: 21 Aug 2008

Dick M. Carpenter II

Institute for Justice

John K. Ross

Institute for Justice

Abstract

Business interests sometimes use titling laws - laws establishing who can use professional titles - as a form of occupational regulation to restrict entry. Such laws allow practitioners to provide services without a license, but deny them the ability to communicate openly to the public about those services. Because legislators typically see titling laws as less restrictive than licensure, industry leaders pursue them as an initial and more acceptable form of regulation. Once the laws are in place, insiders then seek to transform them into full licensure, which provides an even stronger barrier to entry.

Keywords: Licensing, regulation, title acts, titling laws, interior design, first amendment, free speech, entrepreneurial rights, licensure, cartels

JEL Classification: D4, D42, D45, H00, H1, J2, J23, J28, J4, J44, K2, K23, L8, L84

Suggested Citation

Carpenter, Dick M. and Ross, John K., Designing Cartels Through Censorship. Regulation, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 14-18, Summer 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1222733

Dick M. Carpenter II (Contact Author)

Institute for Justice ( email )

901 N. Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22203
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ij.org

John K. Ross

Institute for Justice ( email )

901 N. Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22203
United States

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