Efficient Unemployment Insurance
34 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 1999 Last revised: 10 Apr 2022
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Efficient Unemployment Insurance
Date Written: August 1998
Abstract
This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any UI. In contrast, in an economy with risk-averse workers, a positive level of UI maximizes output. Therefore, moderate UI not only improves risk-sharing, but also increases output.
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