54 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2008 Last revised: 11 Jun 2010
Using a dataset of proxy recommendations and voting results for uncontested director elections from 2005 and 2006 at S&P 1500 companies, we examine how advisors make their recommendations. Of the four firms we study, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ), ISS has the largest market share and is widely regarded as the most influential. We find that the four proxy advisory firms differ substantially from each other both in their willingness to issue a withhold recommendation and in the factors that affect their recommendation.
It is not clear that these differences, or the bases for the recommendations, are transparent to the institutions that purchase proxy advisory services. If the differences are not apparent, investors may not accurately perceive the information content associated with a withhold recommendation, and investors may rely on those recommendations based on an erroneous understanding of the basis for that recommendation. To the extent that proxy advisors aggregate information for the purpose of facilitating an informed shareholder vote, these limitations may impair the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise. If the differences are apparent, our results show that investors, though selecting a proxy advisor, can indirectly choose the bases for their vote on directors. To that extent, it is likely that proxy advisory firms will retain more investor clients if their recommendations are based on factors that their clients consider relevant.
Keywords: corporations, securities law, shareholder voting, proxy recommendations, proxy advisory services, election of directors, regression analysis
JEL Classification: G34, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Choi, Stephen J. and Fisch, Jill E. and Kahan, Marcel, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 82, Pg. 649, 2009; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1225963 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1225963