Information, Incentives and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises
Posted: 3 Sep 1998
There are 2 versions of this paper
Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1769
Number of pages: 47
Posted: 20 Apr 2016
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Abstract
This article analyzes the experience with performance contracts between developing country governments and the managers of their state owned enterprises. It identifies how problems of information asymmetry, incentives, and commitment can lead to shirking. It applies this conceptual framework to a sample of 12 contracts with monopoly state enterprises in six developing countries and finds that all suffer from serious contracting problems and there is no pattern of improved performance that can be attributed to the contracts.
JEL Classification: D21, D23, L32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Shirley, Mary M. and Xu, Lixin Colin, Information, Incentives and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=122628
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