Information Revelation Through Option Exercise

Posted: 8 Sep 1998


In many real-world situations, agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information. In such a setting, agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies. The building of an office building, the drilling of an exploratory oil well, and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants. This paper develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information. Many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed. In particular, informational cascades, where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon, may arise endogenously.

JEL Classification: G14, G31, G13

Suggested Citation

Grenadier, Steven R., Information Revelation Through Option Exercise. Available at SSRN:

Steven R. Grenadier (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-0706 (Phone)
650-725-6152 (Fax)

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