Issue Visibility, Subconstituency Politics, and Legislative Representation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Using the Armenian Genocide Resolution

41 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2008

See all articles by Benjamin G. Bishin

Benjamin G. Bishin

University of California, Riverside (UCR) - Department of Political Science

Thomas J. Hayes

Trinity University

Date Written: August 15, 2008

Abstract

To what extent are citizens able to control their elected officials? Conflicting results in studies of legislative representation are frequently attributed to issue visibility as legislators are thought to be more responsive on more visible issues. Others suggest that legislators are more responsive to subconstituencies of intense voters regardless of issue visibility. Unfortunately, the logic underlying these explanations has not yet been articulated, and data needed to test them does not exist. Employing a natural experiment, we exploit the sudden increase in issue visibility and the corresponding change in co-sponsorship behavior surrounding recognition of the Armenian genocide to investigate these theories. We are unable to detect any evidence that visibility enhances responsiveness in either setting, however, legislators seem to consistently represent subconstituencies' preferences. The results suggest that popular sovereignty is undermined when intense issue publics exist.

Keywords: representation, responsiveness, armenian genocide, Congress, cosponsorship, intensity, visibility, subconstituency, subconstituencies, issue public

JEL Classification: H10, H56

Suggested Citation

Bishin, Benjamin G. and Hayes, Thomas J., Issue Visibility, Subconstituency Politics, and Legislative Representation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment Using the Armenian Genocide Resolution (August 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1230013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1230013

Benjamin G. Bishin (Contact Author)

University of California, Riverside (UCR) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Riverside, CA 92521
United States

Thomas J. Hayes

Trinity University ( email )

San Antonio, TX 78212
United States

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