Referendum, Response, and Consequences for Sudan: The Game Between Juba and Khartoum

53 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Ibrahim Elbadawi

Ibrahim Elbadawi

World Bank - Economic Development Institute

Gary Milante

World Bank - Policy Research Department

Costantino Pischedda

Columbia University

Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper presents a game theory model of the strategic interaction between Khartoum and Juba leading up to the referendum on Sudan's partition in 2011. The findings show that excessive militarization and brinksmanship is a rational response for both actors, neither of which can credibly commit to lower levels of military spending under the current status quo. This militarization is often at the expense of health and education expenditures, suggesting that the opportunity cost of militarization is foregone economic development. These credibility issues might be resolved by democratization, increased transparency, reduction of information asymmetries, and efforts to promote economic and political cooperation. The paper explores these devices, demonstrating how they can contribute to Pareto preferred outcomes in equilibrium. The authors characterize the military expenditure associated with the commitment problem experienced by both sides, estimate its costs from data for Sudan, and identify the opportunity cost of foregone development implied by continued, excessive, and unsustainable militarization.

Keywords: Post Conflict Reconstruction, Peace & Peacekeeping, Population Policies, Public Sector Expenditure Analysis & Management, Debt Markets

Suggested Citation

Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Milante, Gary and Pischedda, Costantino, Referendum, Response, and Consequences for Sudan: The Game Between Juba and Khartoum (July 1, 2008). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Vol. , pp. -, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1233060

Ibrahim Elbadawi (Contact Author)

World Bank - Economic Development Institute ( email )

1818 H Street
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ielbadawi

Gary Milante

World Bank - Policy Research Department ( email )

1818 H Street
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Costantino Pischedda

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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