Migration and Human Capital: Self-Selection of Indentured Servants To the Americas

Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 882-905, 2006

Posted: 18 Aug 2008

See all articles by Ran Abramitzky

Ran Abramitzky

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Fabio Braggion

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 1, 2006

Abstract

Indentured servitude was an important form of white migration to America. The focus of this paper is the self-selection of indentured servants into various colonial destinations and the implications of selection for human capital evaluation. Migrants are assumed to choose their most preferred colonial destination based on factors such as their age, sex, literacy, and the length of servitude expected in each location, which is itself a function of individual's observable and unobservable characteristics. We analyze a list of 1890 migrants from England between 1718 and 1759 and find that servants were favorably selected to the mainland (especially to southern colonies) and negatively selected to the West Indies, and that self selection affected substantially the duration of servitude of newcomers. Moreover, the duration of servitude does not seem to be an important determinant of servants' destination choice.

JEL Classification: F22, J00, J61, N31, N33, O15

Suggested Citation

Abramitzky, Ran and Braggion, Fabio, Migration and Human Capital: Self-Selection of Indentured Servants To the Americas (April 1, 2006). Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 882-905, 2006 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1233802

Ran Abramitzky (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Fabio Braggion

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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