Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Observation
Posted: 10 Sep 1998
Abstract
The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and the second, the definition of new types of punishments using approachability techniques.
JEL Classification: C70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Tomala, Tristan, Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Observation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=124309
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