Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Observation

Posted: 10 Sep 1998

See all articles by Tristan Tomala

Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Abstract

The set of payoffs associated to pure uniform equilibria of a repeated game with public observation is characterized in terms of the one shot-game. The key of the result is first, a study of the effect of undetectable deviations and the second, the definition of new types of punishments using approachability techniques.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Tomala, Tristan, Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Observation. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=124309

Tristan Tomala (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

12, place du Panthéon
Paris, IL
France

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