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Tying as Price Discrimination in Antitrust Law

26 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2008 Last revised: 24 Feb 2011

Sahin Ardiyok

Bilkent University The Law School

Date Written: July 21, 2008

Abstract

This paper focuses on the question of whether the task of distributing the welfare between producers and consumers is in the domain or jurisprudence of courts or antitrust agencies. Indeed, these foundations are far away from the understanding introduced by Chicago school when the matter in hand is about price discrimination. But contrary to this, public choice framework outlines the allocation of tasks about distributing the welfare by means of macro economic measures such as taxing. So it is paradoxical to accept certain kinds of price discrimination are illegal even if they were proved to increase efficiency and total welfare.

In this paper, I give the definition of price discrimination and tying by using economic approach. Types of tying practices which is not deemed to be price discrimination are also presented. In addition the case law about tying as price discrimination is a part of the study. And essentially, antitrust policy choices in order to distinguish tying arrangements which are efficient and social welfare practices are discussed.

Keywords: Antitrust law, tying, monopolization, abuse of dominant position, price discrimination, market power

JEL Classification: K21, L12

Suggested Citation

Ardiyok, Sahin, Tying as Price Discrimination in Antitrust Law (July 21, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1245022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1245022

Sahin Ardiyok (Contact Author)

Bilkent University The Law School ( email )

Ankara, 06800
Turkey

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