Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market

45 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2008 Last revised: 4 Aug 2010

See all articles by Arindrajit Dube

Arindrajit Dube

University of California, Berkeley - Institute for Research on Labor and Employment

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: August 2008

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between shared capitalist modes of pay and shared modes of decision-making via employee involvement and related committees and between them and measures of productivity and worker well-being in two data sets: the employee based Worker Participation and Representation Survey and the California Establishment Survey. It finds in both data sets that the forms of shared compensation are complementary in the sense that they are more likely to be found together than if firms chose them separately; that shared compensation systems are positively associated with shared decision-making; and that combining shared compensation systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes than each system by itself.

Suggested Citation

Dube, Arindrajit and Freeman, Richard B., Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market (August 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14272. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1248933

Arindrajit Dube

University of California, Berkeley - Institute for Research on Labor and Employment ( email )

2521 Channing Way #5555
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-9951 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/cwed/dube.html

Richard B. Freeman (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies ( email )

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United Kingdom

Harvard University ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-868-3900 (Phone)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

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London WC2A 2AE

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