Are Taxes and Risk Substitutional or Complementary Determinants of Entrepreneurial Investment Policy? (Steuern und Risiko als substitutionale oder komplementaere Determinanten unternehmerischer Investitionspolitik?)

Arqus Quantitative Tax Research Discussion Paper No. 51

26 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2008 Last revised: 13 Aug 2012

See all articles by Rainer Niemann

Rainer Niemann

University of Graz, Center for Accounting Research; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Caren Sureth-Sloane

Paderborn University; Vienna University of Economics and Business; TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency

Date Written: August 25, 2008

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of taxation on risk-taking under irreversibility. We integrate a simple tax system into a real option model. Under irreversibility and risk neutrality, raising the tax rate can either increase or reduce risk-taking. We numerically derive tax-volatility indifference curves, i.e. combinations of volatility and tax rate, which induce identical investment thresholds. Using this novel illustration technique it is possible to identify conditions for an unambiguous influence of taxes on risk-taking. Our simulations indicate that raising the tax rate increases risk-taking under low volatility. Implementing a final withholding tax on capital income tends to reduce risky investment. Our findings extend the well-known tax effects on investment from certainty with respect to uncertainty, irreversibility, and risk-taking.

Keywords: risk-taking, taxes and investment decisions, uncertainty, real options

JEL Classification: H25, H21

Suggested Citation

Niemann, Rainer and Sureth-Sloane, Caren, Are Taxes and Risk Substitutional or Complementary Determinants of Entrepreneurial Investment Policy? (Steuern und Risiko als substitutionale oder komplementaere Determinanten unternehmerischer Investitionspolitik?) (August 25, 2008). Arqus Quantitative Tax Research Discussion Paper No. 51, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1253903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1253903

Rainer Niemann (Contact Author)

University of Graz, Center for Accounting Research ( email )

Universitätsstr. 15 / G2
Graz, 8010
Austria
+43-316-380-6444 (Phone)
+43-316-380-9595 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-graz.at/steuer

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Caren Sureth-Sloane

Paderborn University ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
Paderborn, 33098
Germany

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency ( email )

Warburger Straße 100
Paderborn, 33098
Germany

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