Networks with Group Counterproposals

18 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2008  

Ricardo Nieva

Universidad de Lima

Date Written: July 2008

Abstract

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.

Keywords: Efficiency, Bargaining Protocol, Counterproposals, Network Formation, Transfers, Externalities, Groups, Coalitions

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C73, C78

Suggested Citation

Nieva, Ricardo, Networks with Group Counterproposals (July 2008). FEEM Working Paper No. 61.2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1259656 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259656

Ricardo Nieva (Contact Author)

Universidad de Lima ( email )

Av. Javier Prado Este, cuadra 46 s/n Monterrico, L
Lima, Lima
Peru

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