A Theoretical Model of the Distribution of Teacher Attention under Benchmark Testing
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 29, pp. 1-8, 2008
21 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2008 Last revised: 18 Jun 2011
Date Written: August 27, 2008
This paper provides a tractable theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives created by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research. A numerical simulation is used to confirm the model's ability to capture this targeting behavior.
Keywords: Education, Teacher Incentives, Standardized Testing
JEL Classification: I2, D0
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation