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Regulatory Structure under EC Competition Laws: Lessons for India

Manupatra Competition Law Reports, Vols. 2(3), pp. B289-B297, 2011

9 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2008 Last revised: 16 Jan 2012

Tarun Jain

Supreme Court of India; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Law University Jodhpur (NLUJ)

Date Written: December 1, 2011

Abstract

The competition law rules are of immense importance for optimal functioning of the economic variables as they not only vouchsafe against the monopolistic and exploitative tendencies of the bigger market players, they are also instrumental in providing the smaller and newer entrants in the markets to work towards achieving self-sustaining levels. However, their operation is contingent upon position sought to be obtained in the markets for which these rules are designed. While these rules may vary depending upon jurisdiction, nonetheless the essential premise remains the same. In this backdrop this article examines the regulatory structure in vogue under the EC competition law and to identify the key traits which may as well be applicable for the recently formulated Competition Commission of India, in its quest towards rendering competition workable in the Indian markets.

The Chapterization is as under:

1. Introduction

2. Regulatory Structure under EC competition laws
2.1 The legal regime for competition in EC
2.2 The EC Regulatory Authorities
2.2.1 EC Commission
2.2.2 The Advisory Committee
2.2.3 National Competition Authorities & European Competition Network

3. Lessons for India
3.1 Regulatory Structure under the Competition Act, 2002
3.2 Lessons from the EC model for India

4. Conclusion

Keywords: India, EC, Competition law

JEL Classification: K21, K40

Suggested Citation

Jain, Tarun, Regulatory Structure under EC Competition Laws: Lessons for India (December 1, 2011). Manupatra Competition Law Reports, Vols. 2(3), pp. B289-B297, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1260148

Tarun Jain (Contact Author)

Supreme Court of India ( email )

New Delhi
India

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

London
United Kingdom

National Law University Jodhpur (NLUJ)

Jodhpur
India

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