Information, Coordination and the Industrialization of Countries

Posted: 1 Sep 2008

See all articles by Florian Englmaier

Florian Englmaier

Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Markus Reisinger

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - Economics Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition, we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. (JEL codes: C72, C79, D82, F21, O12, O14)

Keywords: Information, coordination, industrialization, development, Global Games, equilibrium refinements, big push

Suggested Citation

Englmaier, Florian and Reisinger, Markus, Information, Coordination and the Industrialization of Countries (September 2008). CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 54, Issue 3, pp. 534-550, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1260605 or http://dx.doi.org/ifn006

Florian Englmaier (Contact Author)

Department of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Markus Reisinger

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management - Economics Department ( email )

Sonnemannstra├če 9-11
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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