Flexible Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment

42 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2008

See all articles by Erkki Koskela

Erkki Koskela

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Bank of Finland - Research Department; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jan Koenig

Free University of Berlin (FUB)

Date Written: August 2008

Abstract

We analyze the questions associated with flexible outsourcing both with committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic labour markets. How does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? What is the relationship between outsourcing cost, profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment, when profit sharing is also a part of the compensation schemes in other industries? In the case of committed profit sharing, outsourcing cost increases wage. Optimal flexible profit sharing is smaller than in the absence of outsourcing, but outsourcing cost and wage will have ambiguous effect on optimal flexible profit sharing. Implementing profit sharing can help to avoid outsourcing due to a direct productivity effect and a wage effect. For equilibrium unemployment the effects of outsourcing cost and profit sharing are ambiguous both in case of committed and flexible profit sharing. In the case of zero effort elasticity there is no committed or flexible profit sharing in the absence or presence of outsourcing and in this case lower outsourcing cost will decrease unemployment.

Keywords: flexible outsourcing, profit sharing, labour market imperfection, employee effort, equilibrium unemployment

JEL Classification: E23, E24, H22, J23, J33, J82

Suggested Citation

Koskela, Erkki and Koenig, Jan, Flexible Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment (August 2008). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2382. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1261798

Erkki Koskela (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358 9 191 8894 (Phone)
+358 9 191 8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de/servlet/page?_pageid=56&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30&pa_id=7298

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Bank of Finland - Research Department ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jan Koenig

Free University of Berlin (FUB) ( email )

Van't-Hoff-Str. 8
Berlin, Berlin 14195
Germany

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