Effectuating Public International Law Through Market Mechanisms?

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 165, No. 1, pp. 33-57

U. of St.Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-21

CLPE Research Paper No. 34/2008

27 Pages Posted: 2 Sep 2008 Last revised: 16 Jul 2014

See all articles by Anne van Aaken

Anne van Aaken

University of Hamburg, Law School; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: October 31, 2008

Abstract

Traditionally, the enforcement of Public International Law (PIL) was a task of states: the addressees and the enforcers of PIL were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, the influence of private market actors on the enforcement has been neglected although the idea of using private interests in order to foster social goals has a long history. This article draws on theoretical insights of a rational-choice approach to PIL in order to analyze the prerequisites of effectuating PIL through private market actor incentives and market mechanisms.

Keywords: Public International Law, Enforcement, Market mechanisms

JEL Classification: K33, F55, F59

Suggested Citation

van Aaken, Anne, Effectuating Public International Law Through Market Mechanisms? (October 31, 2008). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Vol. 165, No. 1, pp. 33-57; U. of St.Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2008-21; CLPE Research Paper No. 34/2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1262189

Anne Van Aaken (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg, Law School ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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