The Gains from Differentiated Policies to Control Stock Pollution When Producers are Heterogeneous

Posted: 3 Sep 2008

See all articles by Angels Xabadia

Angels Xabadia

University of Girona - Department of Economics

Renan-Ulrich Goetz

Universitat de Girona

David Zilberman

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics

Date Written: 2008-03

Abstract

We derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents. The taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice. We also derive second-best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among themselves. Different policies will affect the timing for when, and the extent to which, conservation technologies are adopted. A numerical example, based on the California drainage problem, shows significant efficiency gains from the optimal policy compared to no intervention, but much of the gains are lost with second-best interventions. The gains from optimal policies do not always increase with the degree of heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

Xabadia, Angels and Goetz, Renan-Ulrich and Zilberman, David, The Gains from Differentiated Policies to Control Stock Pollution When Producers are Heterogeneous (2008-03). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, Issue 4, pp. 1059-1063, November 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1263059 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01168.x

Angels Xabadia (Contact Author)

University of Girona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus de Montilivi
Girona, Girona 17071
Spain

Renan-Ulrich Goetz

Universitat de Girona ( email )

Girona, 17071
Spain
+ 34 972 418236 (Phone)
+ 34 972 418032 (Fax)

David Zilberman

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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