Do Overlapping Land Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda

Posted: 3 Sep 2008

See all articles by Klaus Deininger

Klaus Deininger

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Daniel Ayalew Ali

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: 2008-03

Abstract

While the need for land-related investment for sustainable land management and increased productivity is well recognized, quantitative evidence on agricultural productivity effects of secure property rights in Africa is scant. Within-household analysis of investments by owner-cum-occupants in Uganda points toward significant and quantitatively large investment effects of full ownership. Registration is estimated to have no investment effects, whereas measures to strengthen occupancy rights attenuate investment disincentives. While this supports the importance of secure tenure as a precondition for growth, it also suggests that interventions aiming to increase tenure security need to be context-specific for it to be fully effective.

Suggested Citation

Deininger, Klaus and Ali, Daniel Ayalew, Do Overlapping Land Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda (2008-03). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 869-882, November 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1263062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01171.x

Klaus Deininger (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/kdeininger

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Daniel Ayalew Ali

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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