The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
34 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2008 Last revised: 14 May 2009
Date Written: April 1, 2009
Abstract
During 2002-2004, the identities of millions of Venezuelan voters who had signed petitions to recall President Hugo Chavez or opposition politicians from office were made public by the government. We match these petition signers to manufacturing firm owners and household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of political expression. Put simply, do individuals who join the political opposition pay an economic price? We find that pro-opposition individuals see a fall in their income and disproportionately leave public sector employment, while pro-government individuals leave private sector employment. Pro-opposition firms show rising tax burdens, falling profits, and less access to foreign exchange, while the marginal products of capital and labor in pro-government firms decreased. The misallocation of resources associated with political polarization after 2002 contributed to a 6% decline in TFP in our sample of firms.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN
Recommended Papers
-
The Political Economy of Clientelism
By James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier
-
The Political Economy of Clientelism
By James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier
-
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism
By Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu
-
By James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik
-
Democratization and Clientelism: Why are Young Democracies Badly Governed?
-
By Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter
-
By Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter
-
By Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter
-
What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development - and Vice Versa?
