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New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations

51 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2008 Last revised: 15 Mar 2010

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Illinois Brick held that only direct purchasers successfully can sue for damages under federal antitrust law. Since this left most true victims of antitrust violations without an effective remedy, most states enacted Illinois Brick Repealers (IBRs), to give indirect purchasers the right to sue for damages when firms violate analogous state laws.

Although many benefits would arise if national legislation overturned Illinois Brick, to date every attempt to achieve a comprehensive federal solution has failed. Because this thirty year stalemate is almost certain to continue, this article instead focused on reform at the state level, where reform is much more achievable.

This article presents a large number of IBR options that address the spectrum of a state's potential needs, together with commentary giving the major effects, advantages and disadvantages of each. As its Conclusion, this article suggests its own Model State Illinois Brick Repealer legislation.

Keywords: antitrust, Illinois Brick, damages, price fixing, cartel, consumers, indirect purchasers, direct purchasers, state antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, L4

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H., New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations (2010). University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research; Alabama Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1267202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1267202

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

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