Does School Privatization Improve Educational Achievement? Evidence from Sweden's Voucher Reform

34 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2008

See all articles by Anders Bohlmark

Anders Bohlmark

Stockholm University

Mikael Lindahl

University of Bonn; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

This paper evaluates general achievement effects of choice and competition between private and public schools at the nine-year school level by assessing a radical voucher reform that was implemented in Sweden in 1992. Starting from a situation where the public schools essentially were monopolists on all local school markets, the degree of privatization has developed very differently across municipalities over time as a result of this reform. We estimate the impact of an increase in private enrolment on short, medium and long-term educational outcomes of all pupils using within-municipality variation over time, and control for differential pre-reform and concurrent municipality trends. We find that an increase in the private school share moderately improves short-term educational outcomes such as 9th-grade GPA and the fraction of students who choose an academic high school track. However, we do not find any impact on medium or long-term educational outcomes such as high school GPA, university attainment or years of schooling. We conclude that the first-order short-term effect is too small to yield lasting positive effects.

Keywords: private schooling, choice, competition, educational achievement

JEL Classification: I22, I28, H40

Suggested Citation

Bohlmark, Anders and Lindahl, Mikael, Does School Privatization Improve Educational Achievement? Evidence from Sweden's Voucher Reform. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3691. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1267832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0042-7092.2007.00700.x

Anders Bohlmark (Contact Author)

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Mikael Lindahl

University of Bonn ( email )

Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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