An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind Affirmative Action

Posted: 16 Sep 2008

See all articles by Roland G. Fryer

Roland G. Fryer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); American Bar Foundation; University of Chicago

Glenn C. Loury

Brown University - Department of Economics; Brown University - Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs

Tolga Yuret

Boston University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2008

Abstract

This article offers an economic analysis of color-blind alternatives to conventional affirmative action policies in higher education, focusing on efficiency issues. When the distribution of applicants' traits is fixed (i.e., in the short-run) color blindness leads colleges to shift weight from academic traits that predict performance to social traits that proxy for race. Using data on matriculates at several selective colleges and universities, we estimate that the short-run efficiency cost of “blind” relative to “sighted” affirmative action is comparable to the cost colleges would incur were they to ignore standardized test scores when deciding on admissions. We then build a model of applicant competition with endogenous effort in order to study long-run incentive effects. We show that, compared to the sighted alternative, color-blind affirmative action is inefficient because it flattens the function mapping effort into a probability of admission in the model's equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

Fryer, Roland G. and Loury, Glenn C. and Yuret, Tolga, An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind Affirmative Action (October 2008). The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 319-355, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1268649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm053

Roland G. Fryer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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University of Chicago ( email )

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Glenn C. Loury

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Brown University - Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs ( email )

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Tolga Yuret

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

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