Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries

61 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2008 Last revised: 13 Feb 2022

See all articles by Alberto F. Alesina

Alberto F. Alesina

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

This paper has three goals. The first (and perhaps the most important one) is to provide a new compilation of data on ethnic, linguistic and religious composition at the sub-national level for a large number of countries. This data set allows us to measure segregation of different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups within the same country. The second goal is to correlate measures of segregation with measures of quality of the polity and policymaking. The third is to construct an instrument that helps to overcome the endogeneity problem due to the fact that groups move within country borders, partly in response to policies. Our results suggest that more segregated countries in terms of ethnicity and language, i.e., those where groups live more spatially separately, have a substantially lower quality of government. In contrast, there is no relationship between religious segregation and the government quality.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Segregation and the Quality of Government in a Cross-Section of Countries (September 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w14316, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1269222

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

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France

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