Central Bank: The Chexsystems(Sm) Qualifile(R) Decision

Posted: 18 Sep 2008  

Dennis Campbell

Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit

Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy

Emily McClintock Ekins

Cato Institute; Reason Foundation

Peter Tufano

University of Oxford - Said Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Oxford - Said Business School

Date Written: July 19, 2007

Abstract

SUBJECT AREAS: Banking, Commercial banking, Customer acquisition, Risk management.

The "Central Bank" series analyzes the use of information and product design for managing the counterparty risk of newly acquired customers. Central Bank, a mid-sized regional U.S. bank, was attempting to grow its customer base by increasing the number of new checking accounts. Like many banks, Central saw checking accounts as an important tool for customer acquisition and loyalty-building. However, the bank realized that the aggressive pursuit of new accounts could result in an increased number of overdrafts and, ultimately, customer defaults. The first case, "Central Bank: The ChexSystems(SM) QualiFile(R) Decision," analyzes how QualiFile, a debit scoring product commercialized by ChexSystems, can be used to manage this risk.

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Dennis and Martinez-Jerez, Francisco de Asis and Ekins, Emily McClintock and Tufano, Peter, Central Bank: The Chexsystems(Sm) Qualifile(R) Decision (July 19, 2007). HBS Case No.: 208-029. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1270178

Dennis Campbell (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez

University of Notre Dame - Department of Accountancy ( email )

Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Emily McClintock Ekins

Cato Institute ( email )

1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001-5403
United States

Reason Foundation ( email )

United States

Peter Tufano

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0) 1865 288551 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 (0) 1865 288551 (Phone)

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