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Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment

23 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2008 Last revised: 14 Jul 2015

Alejandro E. Camacho

University of California Irvine School of Law; Center for Progressive Reform

Date Written: September 19, 2008

Abstract

This brief article, written for a symposium on "Collaboration and the Colorado River," evaluates the U.S. Department of the Interior's Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program ("AMP"). The AMP has been advanced as a pioneering collaborative and adaptive approach for both decreasing scientific uncertainty in support of regulatory decision-making and helping manage contentious resource disputes -- in this case, the increasingly thorny conflict over the Colorado River's finite natural resources. Though encouraging in some respects, the AMP serves as a valuable illustration of the flaws of existing regulatory processes purporting to incorporate collaboration and regulatory adaptation into the decision-making process. Born in the shadow of the law and improvised with too little thought as to its structure, the AMP demonstrates the need to attend to the design of the regulatory process and integrate mechanisms that compel systematic program evaluation and adaptation. As such, the AMP provides vital information on how future collaborative experiments might be modified to enhance their prospects of success.

Keywords: collaborative adaptive management, collaborative planning, consensus, ecosystem management, environmental management, Glen Canyon Dam, joint fact-finding, natural resource management, public participation, stakeholder engagement, AMP, dispute resolution

Suggested Citation

Camacho, Alejandro E., Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment (September 19, 2008). Nevada Law Review, Vol. 8, 2008; Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 08-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1270743

Alejandro E. Camacho (Contact Author)

University of California Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 East Peltason Drive
4500-A
Irvine, CA 92697-1000
United States
949-824-4160 (Phone)

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States

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