Media Versus Special Interests
48 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2008 Last revised: 28 Sep 2022
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Media Versus Special Interests
Media Versus Special Interests
Media versus Special Interests
Date Written: September 2008
Abstract
We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.
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