Assortative Marriage and the Effects of Government Homecare Subsidy Programs on Gender Wage and Participation Inequality

20 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2008

See all articles by Seungjin Han

Seungjin Han

McMaster University - Department of Economics

David Bjerk

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 24, 2006

Abstract

We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled males in equilibrium, even when males and females constitute ex-ante identical populations. We then examine how different government homecare subsidy schemes may affect such gender inequality in the labor market. We show that the effect of government homecare subsidy schemes on gender inequality depends crucially on the form in which the subsidy is given and to whom it is allocated.

Keywords: Gender Inequality, Discrimination, Subsidized Childcare

JEL Classification: H42, H24, J71, J16, J13

Suggested Citation

Han, Seungjin and Bjerk, David, Assortative Marriage and the Effects of Government Homecare Subsidy Programs on Gender Wage and Participation Inequality (December 24, 2006). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, Nos. 5-6, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1273333

Seungjin Han

McMaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4
Canada

David Bjerk (Contact Author)

Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )

500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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