Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1274943
 
 

References (6)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search


Scott Duke Kominers


Harvard University

November 12, 2008


Abstract:     
Building upon the static model of Athey and Ellison (2008), we demonstrate the efficient convergence of dynamic position auctions in the presence of consumer search. The entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow this convergence. Our methods are extensions of those introduced by Cary et al. (2008). The applicability of these methods in the presence of consumer search indicates the robustness of the approach and suggests that convergence of dynamic position auction models is demonstrable whenever the associated static equilibrium strategies are sufficiently well-behaved.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: position auctions, dynamic auctions, convergence, consumer search

JEL Classification: C62, C73, D44, L86, M37


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Date posted: October 20, 2008 ; Last revised: November 18, 2008

Suggested Citation

Kominers, Scott Duke, Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search (November 12, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1274943 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1274943

Contact Information

Scott Duke Kominers (Contact Author)
Harvard University ( email )
Rock Center, Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.scottkom.com/
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