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Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search

12 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2008 Last revised: 18 Nov 2008

Scott Duke Kominers

Harvard University

Date Written: November 12, 2008

Abstract

Building upon the static model of Athey and Ellison (2008), we demonstrate the efficient convergence of dynamic position auctions in the presence of consumer search. The entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow this convergence. Our methods are extensions of those introduced by Cary et al. (2008). The applicability of these methods in the presence of consumer search indicates the robustness of the approach and suggests that convergence of dynamic position auction models is demonstrable whenever the associated static equilibrium strategies are sufficiently well-behaved.

Keywords: position auctions, dynamic auctions, convergence, consumer search

JEL Classification: C62, C73, D44, L86, M37

Suggested Citation

Kominers, Scott Duke, Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search (November 12, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1274943 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1274943

Scott Duke Kominers (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

Rock Center
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.scottkom.com/

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