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Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust

12 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2008  

Herbert J. J. Hovenkamp

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; University College London

Date Written: October 1, 2008

Abstract

Joseph Schumpeter's vision of competition saw it as a destructive process in which effort, assets and fortunes were continuously destroyed by innovation. One possible implication is that antitrust's attention on short-run price and output issues is myopic: what seems at first glance to be a monopolistic exclusionary practice might really be an innovative enterprise with enormous payoffs in the long run. While this may be the case, three qualifications are critical. First, one must not confuse the prospect of innovation with the scope of the intellectual property laws; their excesses and special interest capture cast serious doubt on the proposition that they are any better at fostering innovation than antitrust is. Second, for many antitrust practices positive innovation effects are difficult to foresee even on Schumpeter's own expansive and nonmathematical terms. Third, many antitrust violations serve to restrain rather than promote innovation.

Keywords: Antitrust, Monopoly, Innovation, Schumpeter, Patents

JEL Classification: K00, K2, K21, L40, L41, O31

Suggested Citation

Hovenkamp, Herbert J. mname, Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust (October 1, 2008). U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-43. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1275986 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1275986

Herbert J. Hovenkamp (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
319-512-9579 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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