The Problem with Cooperation

Paul B. Stephan III

University of Virginia School of Law

September, 30 2008

The case for international cooperation in competition policy is weaker than commonly thought. First, the lion's share of international transactions (the only kind for which international cooperation is relevant) involves industries for which there is no clear consensus about optimal industry structure. Second, there are strong theoretical reasons why states would exploit all forms of regulation, including competition regulation, to benefit incumbent producers to the cost of consumers. Third, the historical record demonstrates that states have invoked competition policy exactly in this manner. Fourth, arguments that competition regulators can gain solidarity and increased leverage against their domestic adversaries through strengthened international cooperation do not withstand scrutiny.

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Date posted: October 2, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Paul B., The Problem with Cooperation (September, 30 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1276032

Contact Information

Paul B. Stephan III (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7098 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

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