The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting

46 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2008 Last revised: 20 Jan 2009

See all articles by Jennifer E. Bethel

Jennifer E. Bethel

Babson College

Gang Hu

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance

Qinghai Wang

University of Central Florida - College of Business Administration

Date Written: September 23, 2008

Abstract

This paper explores the market for voting rights and shareholder voting around 350 mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2005 by examining institutional-investor trading and voting outcomes. Our results show institutions in aggregate buy shares and hence voting rights before merger record dates. This trading is not related to proxies for merger arbitrage or trading around merger announcements, and thus is not simply a continuation of the latter. Trading and buying before record dates are positively related to voting turnout and negatively related to shareholder support of merger proposals. We explore several possible interpretations of these results.

Suggested Citation

Bethel, Jennifer and Hu, Gang and Wang, Qinghai, The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from Institutional Daily Trading and Voting (September 23, 2008). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 15, pp. 129-145, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1276466

Jennifer Bethel (Contact Author)

Babson College ( email )

Babson Park, MA 02457-0310
United States
781-239-5797 (Phone)
781-239-5004 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.babson.edu/bethel/

Gang Hu

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - School of Accounting and Finance ( email )

M1038, Li Ka Shing Tower
Hung Hom, Kowloon
Hong Kong
(852) 3400 8455 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ganghu.org

Qinghai Wang

University of Central Florida - College of Business Administration ( email )

PO Box 161400
Orlando, FL 32816
United States

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