ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-29
26 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2008
Date Written: September 30, 2008
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these 'conventional' enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.
Keywords: cartels, leniency programmes, enforcement, corruption, organised crime, social norms, collectivism
JEL Classification: D21, K21, K42, L40, Z1
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Stephan, Andreas, Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures Can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools (September 30, 2008). ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 08-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1277205