The Implementation of the European Commission'S Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis
Posted: 8 Oct 2008
Date Written: September 2008
Abstract
The factors influencing the European Commission's decisions under the 2004 Merger Regulation are assessed on a sample of 50 cases. Probit analysis results in the finding that the probability of nonclearance in phase I of the procedure is significantly affected by the estimated market share increase due to the proposed merger, the contestability of the market, and the presence of barriers to entry. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Commission's decisions are biased against market leaders involved in proposed mergers.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Fernández, Borja Martinez and Hashi, Iraj and Jegers, Marc, The Implementation of the European Commission'S Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis (September 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 791-809, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277774 or http://dx.doi.org/nhn006
CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research ( email )
Al. Jana Pawła II 61/212
Warsaw, 01-031
Poland
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