The Implementation of the European Commission'S Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis

Posted: 8 Oct 2008

See all articles by Borja Martinez Fernández

Borja Martinez Fernández

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Iraj Hashi

Staffordshire University Business School; CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research

Marc Jegers

Free University of Brussels (VUB) - Micro-Economics for Profit and Non Profit Sector (MICE)

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

The factors influencing the European Commission's decisions under the 2004 Merger Regulation are assessed on a sample of 50 cases. Probit analysis results in the finding that the probability of nonclearance in phase I of the procedure is significantly affected by the estimated market share increase due to the proposed merger, the contestability of the market, and the presence of barriers to entry. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Commission's decisions are biased against market leaders involved in proposed mergers.

Suggested Citation

Fernández, Borja Martinez and Hashi, Iraj and Jegers, Marc, The Implementation of the European Commission'S Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis (September 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 791-809, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277774 or http://dx.doi.org/nhn006

Borja Martinez Fernández (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Iraj Hashi

Staffordshire University Business School ( email )

Stoke on Trent
United Kingdom

CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research ( email )

Al. Jana Pawła II 61/212
Warsaw, 01-031
Poland

Marc Jegers

Free University of Brussels (VUB) - Micro-Economics for Profit and Non Profit Sector (MICE) ( email )

Brussels
Belgium
+32-2-629 21 13 (Phone)
+32-2-629 22 82 (Fax)

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