Changing the Presumption of When to Regulate: The Rationale of Canadian Telecommunications Reform

Posted: 8 Oct 2008

See all articles by Lawson A. W. Hunter

Lawson A. W. Hunter

Stikeman Elliott LLP; C.D. Howe Institute

Philippe Gauvin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

David Krause

Bell Canada; Carleton University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

In a dynamic environment such as the telecommunications industry, it becomes increasingly difficult to consistently determine and enforce optimal regulatory responses. To improve the rigor and responsiveness of the regulator, the regulatory process should contain four elements: (i) the regulator should have a clear policy framework with an emphasis on reliance upon market forces to the maximum extent feasible; (ii) the regulator should be subject to a standards-based, legally binding test; (iii) there should be an advocate for market forces; and (iv) there should be regular and frequent external reviews. Recent changes to the regulatory process for the Canadian telecommunications industry have incorporated all four of these elements. These changes should limit the regulatory process' ability to impede the benefits that Canadians receive from continuing technological innovation and increasing competitiveness of the telecommunications industry.

Keywords: K23, L50, L96, L98

Suggested Citation

Hunter, Lawson A. W. and Gauvin, Philippe and Krause, David Peter, Changing the Presumption of When to Regulate: The Rationale of Canadian Telecommunications Reform (September 2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 775-790, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1277780 or http://dx.doi.org/nhn023

Lawson A. W. Hunter (Contact Author)

Stikeman Elliott LLP ( email )

5300 Commerce Court West
199 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M5L1B9
Canada

C.D. Howe Institute ( email )

67 Yonge St., Suite 300
Toronto, Ontario M5E 1J8
Canada

Philippe Gauvin

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

David Peter Krause

Bell Canada ( email )

613-785-6344 (Phone)

Carleton University - Department of Economics ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada

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